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How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, Schrödinger and 
De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the situation? Of course, all these 
objections are levelled not against the correctness of the formulae, but against their 
interpretation. .… The lesson to be learned from what I have told of the origin of 
quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of mathematical methods will not 
suffice to produce a satisfactory theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden 
a concept, unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the road.2 
 
 
It is truly surprising how little difference all this makes. Most physicists use 
quantum mechanics every day in their working lives without needing to worry about 
the fundamental problem of its interpretation.3 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I endorse the view that it may be of no relevance to the acceptability of the Everett 
interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory whether or not an informed 
observer can be uncertain about the outcome of a quantum measurement prior to its having 
occurred. However, I suggest that the very possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation 
uncertainty has an essential role to play in both confirmation theory and decision theory in a 
branching universe. This is supported by arguments which do not appeal to Van Fraassen’s 
Reflection Principle. 
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1 Dendritic unitary evolution 
 
The world is more like a tree than a worm (world-tube). So says the ‘relative state’ formulation of 
quantum mechanics introduced by Hugh Everett III [1957] and often called the many-worlds 
interpretation. Much work has been done on the idea but there is still an ongoing dispute as to whether it 
is even intelligible. Two issues dominate the debate on intelligibility: how quantum probabilities are to be 
understood in a branching universe where all physical ‘possibilities’ actually occur and how the furniture 
of our everyday world can be constituted by the fundamental ontology of Everett’s theory, that of the 
quantum-mechanical wave-function4. My aim here is to contribute to the work on probability, though I 
shall suggest that an idea arising in the course of the discussion points the way towards what needs to be 
done on the ontological problem.  
Consider an experiment with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus to make a measurement of the spin of a 
particle of a given type relative to a chosen spatial direction, z. To simplify, there are conventionally two 
possible outcomes for this measurement: the result UP (apparatus indicating z-spin up) and the result 
DOWN. Depending on the details of the experimental setup quantum mechanics assigns an ‘amplitude’ to 
each of these outcomes which is a complex number. According to the Born rule the square of the modulus 
of this number yields the probability of the outcome with that amplitude actually occurring. The squared 
moduli of the amplitudes for the outcomes UP and DOWN thus sum exactly to unity in our simplified 
example which ignores bizarre outcomes of very low amplitude. 
Mainstream quantum mechanics has taken the Born rule to entail the so-called collapse of the 
wave-function. The Stern-Gerlach apparatus stochastically evolves into either the UP state, with 
probability pU, or the DOWN state with probability pD, where pU + pD = 1. Everett proposed replacing 
the concept of stochastic evolution with that of dendritic evolution. The details of this process, if it indeed 
occurs, have turned out to be intricate and involve a phenomenon known as decoherence5 but I shall begin 
with a provisional simplification about which I shall say more later: the apparatus and its environment can 
be thought of as bifurcating into a branch where the apparatus has evolved into the UP state and a branch 
where the apparatus has evolved into the DOWN state. Each of these branches has a quantum-mechanical 
amplitude and the squared moduli of these amplitudes, a quantity often referred to as branch weight, are 
wU and wD respectively, where wU + wD = 1. Given that branch weight is the square of a real number it 
can be conveniently thought of as a cross-sectional area, making vivid the idea of a tree trunk dividing 
into two branches whose combined cross-sectional areas are equal to that of the trunk. I shall henceforth 
refer to branch weight as branch cross-section. David Baker ([2007], §4.1) has suggested that this picture 
of a branching universe, or multiverse, involves an unacceptable circularity since it depends on the 
concept of decoherence for the selection of a measurement basis. Meeting Baker’s objection, if it can be 
met, may require work on the ontological problem I mentioned earlier. 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 Weinberg ([1992], p. 66). 
4 For a current challenge to the ontological coherence of Everett’s theory see Maudlin [2010]. 
5 See Wallace ([2008], §2) for an account and references. Note that a dendritic evolution may also take place in a 
different way during cosmogenesis; see Hogan [2007]. 
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The Born rule is employed by stochastic quantum mechanics (QMs) for making predictions and is 
generally understood to have been corroborated to a high degree by observation. In the case before us the 
prediction is that any physical system which is considered to be of the same type as the given Stern-
Gerlach experimental setup will evolve either into a system showing the result UP with probability pU or 
a system showing the result DOWN with probability pD. The evidence in favour of or against such a 
prediction which can be provided by a single observation is very limited and so a series of experiments 
must be conducted with systems of the appropriate type issuing in an observation of  frequencies for the 
outcomes UP and DOWN. The observed frequencies must fall within a certain range in order to be 
considered as tending to confirm the prediction and that range is determined by standard statistical 
procedures. As is well known, any observed frequency is compatible with any predicted probability but 
an observed frequency has an associated probability of occurring given the predicted probabilities for 
outcomes. If the probability associated with the observed frequency is low relative to other possible 
observations then that observed frequency tends to count against the prediction. Quantum mechanics 
understood stochastically is thus open to the possibility of evidence which would reduce confidence in its 
truth. 
Dendritic quantum mechanics (QMd)6 predicts that a series of experiments conducted with the 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus will result in a ramified branching structure where every possible frequency 
distribution for a given outcome occurs somewhere in the many branches downstream of the experimental 
run. So there is an immediate problem as to how confirmation and disconfirmation are to be understood. 
This is not a matter of whether QMd is empirically preferred or not as against QMs but rather of whether 
quantum mechanics remains a theory open to being tested within the perspective of QMd. If QMd is to be 
favoured over QMs as an interpretation of quantum mechanics it is, as things stand, a conceptual matter 
and not one of superior empirical adequacy. It is primordial to the acceptance of the dendritic rather than 
the stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory that quantum mechanics should 
remain subject to empirical test.  The recent work of Hilary Greaves [2007b] and together with Wayne 
Myrvold [2010] has stressed the centrality of this ‘evidential problem’ for the scientific acceptability of 
QMd. David Albert also notes its importance, expressing the problem in the following way: 
 
Everettian pictures of the world are apparently not going to be susceptible of confirmation 
or disconfirmation by means of experiment - or not (at any rate) by means of anything even 
remotely like the sorts of experiments that we normally take to be confirmatory of Quantum 
Mechanics. 
([2010], §1. Albert’s emphases) 
 
What needs to be done in order to resolve this problem in favour of QMd has been clear for some time7. 
Consider the spin-measurement experiment again and suppose that the details of the setup and the 
application of the Born rule indicate that the results UP and DOWN are equally probable. According to 
                                                
6 This term captures Everett’s central idea, that of a branching environment, however, the dendritic structure is 
but a limited aspect of the universal wave-function, albeit one of special interest to observers such as us. 
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QMs, if the experiment is run a thousand times and the result is UP every time then that should count as 
evidence against quantum mechanics because the observed frequency is so improbable. But QMd predicts 
that there will, with certainty, be a branch where UP has been recorded a thousand times. QMd needs an 
observer on such a branch to be barred from taking the observation as evidence that s/he is on a 
thousandfold-UP branch for that would be equivalent to an adherent of QMs taking the observation of a 
thousand UPs as evidence that s/he was seeing an extremely improbable quantum-mechanical event rather 
than as evidence against quantum mechanics. Such a strategy would make quantum mechanics 
understood stochastically closed to empirical challenge. Quantum mechanics understood dendritically is 
likewise rendered immune to contrary evidence if an observer on the thousandfold-UP branch does not 
have good reason to take the observation as evidence against quantum mechanics and ipso facto against 
QMd.  
That is the required conclusion but the problem is how to derive it. If a concept of pre-
measurement uncertainty were available for QMd then the needed conclusion would fall out immediately. 
The informed QMd theorist would assign probabilities to outcomes and the observer on the thousandfold-
UP branch would conclude that the observation of a thousand UPs is too improbable to be compatible 
with the acceptance of quantum mechanics and so of QMd. Simon Saunders and David Wallace [2008] 
have suggested that a concept of pre-measurement uncertainty is available for QMd. I have criticised that 
proposal elsewhere [2008] and subsequent work on the project can be found in Saunders [2010]. But 
whatever may become of that debate it can be shown to be irrelevant to the scientific acceptability of 
QMd if the needed conclusion about observers in the thousandfold-UP predicament can be derived 
without any reliance on the pre-measurement uncertainty of a fully informed QMd theorist. Greaves 
[2007b] and Greaves and Myrvold [2010] have proposed a route to the needed conclusion which proceeds 
via an analysis of how a subject entertaining QMd could rationally place wagers on the outcomes of 
quantum measurement processes. This method has been challenged by Albert who writes: 
 
But remember (and this is the absolutely crucial point) that deciding whether or not to bet 
on E, in the fission picture, has nothing whatsoever to do with guessing at whether or not E 
is going to occur.  It is, for sure.  And so is −E.  And the business of deciding how to bet is 
just a matter of maximizing the payoffs on those particular branches that - for whatever 
reason - I happen to care most about.   And if one is careful to keep all that at the center of 
one’s attention, and if one is careful not to be mislead by the usual rhetoric of ‘making a 
bet’, then the epistemic strategy that Greaves and Myrvold recommend suddenly looks silly 
and sneaky and unmotivated and wrong.  
([2010], §3(i), Albert’s emphases) 
 
These are strong words and there may well be much discussion of the deep clash of views they express. I 
shall not attempt to resolve the dispute here but what I shall do is argue that Greaves’ and Myrvold’s 
work can be enlighteningly amended in a way which sidesteps this line of objection.  Albert finds it 
                                                                                                                                                   
7 See, for instance, Papineau ([1996], p.239). 
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preposterous that the concept of betting can be applied upstream of branching contexts where all 
‘possible’ relevant outcomes actually occur. And he ridicules the thought that punters’ usual assessment 
of payoffs according to the presumed probabilities of outcomes can be replaced by a concept of pre-
measurement future-directed ‘caring’ introduced by Lev Vaidman ([2002], §6.4) and Greaves ([2004], 
§2.3). The ideas I shall be presenting revolve around the fact that within the perspective of QMd it is 
always possible for a post-measurement subject to be held in a state of ignorance of, and so uncertainty 
about, the result on their branch. In that case, downstream of branching, a punter in the dark can bet in a 
very ordinary sense on whether E has or has not occurred  on their branch. 
In §2 I shall argue that if a particular assumption is adopted about how such a subject should 
assign credences to the possible outcomes on their branch then the evidential problem for QMd can be 
solved and so its status as a properly scientific theory vindicated. In §3 I shall suggest that Greaves’ and 
Myrvold’s arguments may be applied directly to justifying the needed assumption via analysis of betting 
behaviour on the part of a post-measurement, pre-observation subject rather than a pre-measurement 
subject. In §4 I shall argue that although a justification of betting behaviour on the part of the pre-
measurement subject who assumes QMd is not required in order for the interpretation to be a 
scientifically acceptable theory there is a satisfactory analysis available which depends on a novel appeal 
to the possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty. The argument does not invoke Van 
Fraassen’s Reflection Principle which has been applied to the problem but which is unreliable in this 
context. Finally, in §5 I shall discuss some consequences of the foregoing arguments which, though 
bizarre, do not challenge the scientific status of QMd. 
 
2 The Born-Vaidman rule 
 
Consider an observer downstream of an experimental run with the Stern-Gerlach apparatus prepared to 
have equal amplitudes for the UP and DOWN results as before. This observer, call her Hydra, may or 
may not have conducted the experiment herself but she is well informed about the setup and has good 
reason to think that it is reliable. Imagine that Hydra is blindfolded so that she cannot see the frequency 
readout and suppose first of all that her working hypothesis is QMs. Knowing the details of the 
experimental setup Hydra can apply the Born rule to assign probabilities to each of the various possible 
types of frequency distribution she may observe on removing the blindfold. She will set these 
probabilities as equal to the squared modulus of amplitude of each of the relevant components of the 
wave function of the system. Vaidman ([1998], p. 253) has suggested that blindfolded Hydra should 
assign probabilities to seeing particular outcomes on removing the blindfold in exactly the same way if 
her working hypothesis were dendritic rather than stochastic quantum mechanics. 
A few words are appropriate here on a simplification I have been making. According to the 
analysis of branching in terms of decoherence there will not be one but rather a vast and strictly indefinite 
number of branches where a thousand UPs occur. These branches will be macroscopically isomorphic but 
microscopically anisomorphic. The so-called amplitude of the thousandfold-UP branch will in fact be the 
sum of the amplitudes of all those microscopically anisomorphic branches. Vaidman’s idea can be 
expressed if Hydra is understood to inhabit one of the many thousandfold-UP branches but the picture is 
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simpler if Hydra qua observer is imagined to be a single subject somehow inhabiting the totality of the 
relevant near-isomorphic branches. I shall continue with the simplification for the sake of clarity. 
Note that whether it is QMs or QMd which the blindfolded Hydra has in mind it is an assignment 
of a subjective probability, a credence, which she is making: a judgement about the probabilities of seeing 
this or that type of frequency distribution on removing the blindfold. But there seems to be an important 
difference between the Born rule and what I shall call the Born-Vaidman rule in this context. Although 
they act identically in urging Hydra to set her credences equal to the squared moduli of the relevant 
amplitudes they differ in their implied explanations for this. According to the Born rule, as used in QMs, 
the reason Hydra should assign a particular credence to seeing a given result on removing the blindfold is 
that that is the predicted objective dynamical probability that that result has occurred. According to the 
Born-Vaidman rule Hydra believes that she has counterparts in other branches who will see different 
frequency distributions on removing their blindfolds and the reason that Hydra, like each of her 
blindfolded counterparts, should assign a particular credence to seeing a given result is that that result is 
predicted to occur on a branch with the corresponding cross-section (squared modulus of amplitude). 
So there seems to be a problem here. The explanation for Hydra’s credence assignments if she is 
following the Born rule and assuming QMs looks straightforward: she sets her credence to what she 
believes is the objective dynamical chance of a particular result having occurred, following what David 
Lewis has called the Principal Principle ([1980], p. 266). Contrariwise, the explanation for Hydra’s 
credence assignments if she is following the Born-Vaidman rule and assuming QMd looks strange: why 
should believing the branch cross-sections for particular results to be thus and so motivate her to assign 
corresponding credences to seeing any one of those results on removing the blindfold? 
I shall return to this problem in a moment but first of all we should recognise that if Hydra 
presumes QMd and adopts the Born-Vaidman rule she is just as much open to discovering evidence 
which should reduce her confidence in quantum mechanics as she would be in presuming QMs and 
adopting the Born rule. For suppose that Hydra sees that a thousand UPs have occurred on removing her 
blindfold after a run of measurements with the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. If her working hypothesis is QMs 
she will take this observation as reducing her confidence in the truth of quantum mechanics, modulo her 
confidence in the experimental setup, because it would be unreasonable to believe that quantum 
mechanics is true and a circumstance to which she had previously accorded very low credence pertains, 
that is, the occurrence of an event with very low objective dynamical probability. Likewise, if Hydra’s 
working hypothesis is QMd she should take her observation as reducing her confidence in quantum 
mechanics because it would be unreasonable for her to believe that quantum mechanics is true and a 
circumstance to which she had previously accorded very low credence pertains, that is, her finding herself 
on a branch of very low cross-section relative to the branch where the experimental run began. 
This thought needs some unpacking for it might seem that there is an important difference here 
between QMs and QMd. According to QMs Hydra on removing the blindfold sees a state of affairs with a 
low objective dynamical probability of having occurred a few moments earlier and that seems to be an 
improbable state of affairs in a clear sense. But according to QMd Hydra’s being on a branch of very low 
cross-section is not objectively improbable in any sense, it is simply a circumstance to which blindfolded 
Hydra accords low credence if she accepts the Born-Vaidman rule. However, credence can do the work in 
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reducing Hydra’s confidence in quantum mechanics prior to any concept of objective probability. To see 
this, consider what has traditionally been regarded as constituting disconfirmatory evidence in classical 
mechanics where physical processes are taken to be fully determined and so there has, until recently, been 
no question of objective probability being involved. Probability has there been understood subjectively as 
an assignment of credences based on limited knowledge of the world, the so-called ignorance 
interpretation. So in classical mechanics the observation of a state of affairs which has been accorded 
relatively low credence has been taken as counting as evidence against the theory even thought there is no 
sense in which that observed state of affairs is objectively improbable. 
It is true that there have been challenges to the traditional idea that classical mechanics does not 
involve objective probability8 but note that even there it is not suggested that classical mechanics involves 
a stochastic dynamical evolution, which is the type of objective probability which has been taken to be 
suggested by the Born rule. Also, Roman Frigg [2008] has fielded counterarguments and the debate 
remains live. In any case, to dismiss the idea that credence is the fulcrum of confirmation theory in QMd 
would require rejecting what has traditionally been seen as an unproblematic process of confirmation in 
that other deterministic physical theory, classical mechanics.  
Hydra’s predicament on seeing the thousandfold-UP result after removing the blindfold would 
seem to be exactly the same as regards judging the evidence whether she has been using the Born rule and 
QMs or the Born-Vaidman rule and QMd. Unsurprisingly, since the Born rule and the Born-Vaidman rule 
both maintain that the credence for seeing that result should be equal to the squared modulus of amplitude 
of the corresponding component of the wave-function of the system. Hydra has good reason not to believe 
that she is on a branch of low cross-section if assuming QMd just as she has good reason not to believe 
that a dynamical evolution with low objective chance has taken place if assuming QMs. So it seems that 
the evidential problem for QMd dissolves for the temporarily blindfolded post-measurement observer if 
the Born-Vaidman rule is adopted. 
But what if Hydra were not temporarily blindfolded post-measurement? What if an experimental 
run had been conducted and she were simply observing that a thousand UPs have been registered? To 
understand Hydra’s predicament in this case we should first of all note that on the assumption of QMd 
without pre-measurement uncertainty she has no record of a prior prediction that seeing a thousand UPs is 
very improbable9. The prediction she has in hand is that a thousand UPs will be registered on a branch of 
very low cross-section (squared modulus of amplitude) from which it follows that she would assign very 
low credence to seeing that a thousand UPs have occurred if she were blindfolded and applying the Born-
Vaidman rule. 
Since Hydra on the thousandfold-UP branch plainly sees a record of a thousand UPs having 
occurred should she simply accord a credence of unity to seeing that result? Yes and no. Yes in the sense 
that she does not have reason to doubt what she’s seeing, but that is not the sense which is wanted here. 
For suppose that Hydra were assuming QMs and were seeing that a thousand UPs had occurred. In that 
case she would assign a credence of unity to her seeing that result, she would believe her eyes, but she 
                                                
8 For the most recent see Loewer [2004] and Ismael [forthcoming]. 
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would tend to take the observation as evidence against QM, given that no more plausible explanation 
were available, because QMs predicts that the occurrence of a thousand UPs is objectively improbable 
which entails that she would have assigned low credence to seeing that result if she had been blindfolded 
beforehand. 
Recall that the only difference between the Born rule as applied by QMs to the post-measurement, 
pre-observation subject and the Born-Vaidman rule is the explanations they imply for the credence 
assignments. If the Born-Vaidman rule is acceptable in the context of QMd then a strategy is available to 
non-blindfolded Hydra for making a judgement about the evidential status of observing that a thousand 
UPs have occurred. She can base that judgement on the credence she would have assigned to seeing a 
thousand UPs if she had been blindfolded prior to making the observation.  The very possibility of being 
in a state of post-measurement, pre-observation ignorance and so applying the Born-Vaidman rule is 
enough to yield a method for solving the evidential problem of QMd. Hydra is not compelled to adopt 
that method but if she rejects it she should abandon QMd as unscientific if no other method of judging 
evidence is available. 
In that case it is just the acceptability of the Born-Vaidman rule itself which remains at issue. At 
this point it is worth saying something about the acceptability of the concept of dynamical chance in 
QMs. For some reason the idea of an irreducibly stochastic process has come to seem natural and the 
application of the Principal Principle to derive credences from what are believed to be objective chances 
seems compelling. But the contemporary familiarity of the concept of stochastic process ought not to 
make us too complacent. Until the advent of quantum mechanics all physical processes were thought to 
involve a mechanism of some sort but a stochastic dynamical evolution is a process without a mechanism. 
Quantum mechanics understood dendritically respects the tradition in science of explaining processes in 
terms of mechanisms. However, there remains a problem: what motivates adoption of the Born-Vaidman 
rule?  
I shall come to this in the next section but first some further reflection on the picture developed so 
far. We left Hydra on the thousandfold-UP branch. We saw that if her working hypothesis is QMd she has 
good reason to dismiss the idea that she’s on a thousandfold-UP branch and take what she observes as 
evidence against quantum mechanics so long as she has full confidence in the experimental setup. That’s 
because she knows that if she had been blindfolded and were applying the Born-Vaidman rule she would 
have assigned a relatively very low credence to seeing the thousandfold-UP result. However, the 
hypothesis is that Hydra is on a thousandfold-UP branch even though she has reason not to believe that. 
What this shows is that the branch cross-section of Hydra’s environment relative to the branch where the 
experimental run began is radically invisible to her. There is no known way she can measure it directly. If 
she could she would be able to ascertain that she is indeed on a thousandfold-UP branch, incredible as 
that is according to the Born-Vaidman rule. The lack of any means of direct measurement of relative 
branch cross-section in QMd corresponds to the lack of direct access to dynamical chances in QMs. 
According to QMs the observation of a relatively very unlikely event must be taken as evidence against 
                                                                                                                                                   
9 An interesting discussion of the predicament of an observer post-branching is to be found in Saunders ([1997], 
pp. 64-6). 
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quantum mechanics unless that observation is counterbalanced by a mass of other evidence suggesting 
otherwise. There is no way of detecting the supposed fact that an objectively improbable quantum-
mechanical event has occurred. 
The concept of branch cross-section, the squared modulus of amplitude of a branch, is as some 
extant physical quantity hitherto unknown to science. That is the implication of QMd, of course, since 
Everett’s key thought was that the wave-function represents actualia rather than possibilia10. It is 
suggestive of some sort of novel physical extension. The idea is not new; Michael Lockwood ([1989], p. 
232) has called this quantity a superpositional ‘dimension’, not meaning that to be taken too literally, and 
attributes the origin of the idea to David Deutsch. I believe that developing an understanding of the 
concrete physical nature of branch cross-section is central to addressing the fundamental ontological 
problem for QMd which I mentioned at the outset, but I cannot pursue that thought further here.  
 
3  Greaves on uncertainty 
 
We are left with the problem of how to motivate the Born-Vaidman rule if it is not simply to be taken as a 
fundamental postulate of QMd. I believe that this problem might be addressed via work undertaken by 
Greaves and Myrvold but that a change of perspective may be required which arises from a new 
supplementary argument. So far, Greaves’ and Myrvold’s project has been applied to the analysis of a 
probabilistic-like attitude to be adopted by the pre-measurement subject. Greaves has argued for future-
directed assignments of ‘caring measure’ or ‘quasi-credence’ which arises out of trying to resolve both 
the evidential problem which I have been discussing and the problem of how a subject might rationally 
place bets when facing the prospect of a payoff regime associated with the outcomes on various branches. 
If Greaves’ and Myrvold’s work were applied to the assignment of credences by the post-measurement, 
pre-observation subject its relevance to the evidential problem need not involve an irreducible concept of 
caring measure, quasi-credence or ‘α-function’11. Whatever this concept is called, it amounts to the idea 
of a non-credence attitude which mimics credence in the process of pre-measurement decision-making. 
But such a concept looks puzzling. Why should I ‘care’ about the amplitude of a future branch when I 
know that for the inhabitants of that branch the relative amplitude makes no difference whatsoever to 
their quality of experience? An experience of joy or pain is in no way diluted by occurring on a relatively 
low-amplitude branch according to Greaves’ and Myrvold’s view and yet prior to branching an agent 
must be guided by value assignments based on those future branch amplitudes. 
This puzzle can be dissolved if the underlying reason for the assignment of quasi-credences is seen 
to be the possibility of assignments of copper-bottomed credences by the post-measurement, pre-
observation subject. I do not mean that the pre-measurement subject does not need to ‘care’ about future 
branches in the way that Greaves and Myrvold suggest, rather I am arguing that the air of mystery 
surrounding the idea of future-directed caring disappears if it is seen as arising out of a conceptual 
                                                
10 Strictly speaking, the wave-function instantiates actualia in QMd and represents possibilia in QMs. 
11 The term currently used by Greaves and Myrvold [2010]. 
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dependence on the very possibility of the sort of post-measurement ignorance which Vaidman was the 
first to notice. 
Certainly there remains the problem of why the Born-Vaidman rule should apply but if Greaves’ 
and Myrvold’s arguments are correct then purchase on that problem should be gained by applying their 
method to the gambling predicaments of post-measurement, pre-observation subjects. That strategy may 
also be complimented by other work which I shall mention shortly. In the next section I shall explain how 
the problem of guiding the informed pre-measurement punter’s betting can be resolved by an independent 
argument linking possible post-measurement, pre-observation credences with a rationale for pre-
measurement decision-making. 
So far I have argued that the evidential problem for QMd can be solved if the Born-Vaidman rule 
is accepted. This is recognised by Greaves when she writes: 
 
Under relatively uncontentious auxiliary assumptions, a necessary and sufficient condition 
for solving the Epistemic Problem is as follows: establish that the agent who believes that 
QME is true and that branching has occurred, but who has gained no post-split information 
as to which branch she is on, should set her self-locating credences equal to the assumed 
branch weights. ([2007b], §6).  
 
The term ‘QME’ stands for ‘Everettian quantum mechanics’, equivalent to my term ‘QMd’ for ‘dendritic 
quantum mechanics’, an idea which has been developed a great deal since Everett’s original proposal and 
could well do with a more descriptive label. Greaves here calls the evidential problem the ‘Epistemic 
Problem’ but she and Myrvold have more recently used the term ‘Everettian evidential problem’ ([2010], 
§1). Greaves then goes on to discuss a possible objection to her use of the concept of an agent’s pre-
measurement ‘caring measure’ in her defence of QMd and she suggests a ‘Response 1’ to this objection. 
That response makes two points. One is in effect that since the application of the Born rule in QMs 
assumes the Principal Principle without argument to demand more for the correlate of the Principal 
Principle which is assumed by the application of the Born-Vaidman rule in QMd is to apply double 
standards. The other point is that nevertheless this further support for the ‘Everettian Principal Principle’ 
might be available via a programme initiated by Deutsch12. Greaves goes on to write: 
 
Response 1, however, leaves it somewhat mysterious whether the arguments adduced in 
this paper have any role to play in the defence of the Everett interpretation: if we can argue 
from the pre-measurement perspective that the Everettian branch weights play the same 
role as chances in practical action, and we can argue from the post-measurement 
perspective that Everettian branch weights play the same role as chances in theory 
confirmation, then we have solved both the Practical Problem and the Epistemic Problem; 
who cares, then, about the link between the two? 
 11 
We must care about the link for the following reason. If, having independently 
advocated a particular strategy for rational action and a particular epistemic strategy, we 
were to find that the combination of the two led to failure of intertemporal consistency 
……… then our argument as a whole would have landed us in paradox. ([2007], ibid.) 
 
What Greaves calls the practical problem is the problem of how an agent who believes QMd can act 
rationally prior to measurement. For example, if a subject believing QMs is presented with a gamble on 
the outcome of a quantum process s/he can make a judgement about odds and possible payoffs which can 
guide the laying of a stake; a manifestation of the practical problem is how a subject believing QMd can 
make a corresponding judgement about what Barry Loewer has dubbed the ‘bramble’ which is the 
dendritic equivalent of the stochastic setup with branch cross-sections corresponding to chances. The 
argument I shall be presenting in the next section should make it clear that the Born-Vaidman rule can 
also, as it happens, be used to underwrite a rationale for pre-measurement betting,  though that is not a 
requirement for the scientific acceptability of QMd. Recall that the Born-Vaidman rule is equivalent to 
the application of the Born rule to the post-measurement, pre-observation subject so far as the assignment 
of credences is concerned, the difference is the Born-Vaidman rule presumes QMd. Again, I should 
emphasise that the implication is not that Greaves’ and Myrvold’s arguments have no bearing on the 
evidential problem for QMd but rather that their work is not necessary to providing the link between the 
evidential and practical problems and so can be applied directly to the evidential problem by a decision-
theoretic analysis of the predicament of a post-measurement, pre-observation subject, something which 
Greaves herself acknowledges as possible.  
Before going on I want to dwell for a moment on another aspect of Greaves’ motivation for 
avoiding any appeal to the post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty which Vaidman invokes. 
Greaves ([2007b], §5.2.1) gives two reasons for not relying on this form of  uncertainty. The first and 
lesser reason is that it does not generally occur. The second and more important reason for her is: 
 
…exclusive reliance on the adapted Minimum Information argument would promote the 
idea that genuine uncertainty about which outcome (if not pre-measurement, then post-
measurement) occurs is an essential part of the Everettian’s epistemological story, even in 
cases in which all details of the branching structure are known. One of the central aims of 
this paper is to dispel this notion. To fulfil this aim, we must supply an argument that does 
not depend on this sort of ‘branch uncertainty’ at all. ([2007b], ibid.. Greaves’ emphasis) 
 
Why is Greaves so intent on banishing any dependence on post-measurement, pre-observation 
uncertainty? A possible explanation is that she wants to tell the Everettian epistemological story in the 
logically purest way, purged of any unnecessary assumptions. I am arguing that it is the mere possibility 
of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty which may be essential. That is a necessary feature of 
                                                                                                                                                   
12 See Greaves ([2007a], §2 & §3) for an account of this work and references. See Wallace [2010] for the most 
recent manifestation of the project. This is the work which I mentioned may compliment Greaves’ and 
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QMd, just as it is of QMs. But there is a clue in her earlier writing to another aspect of what may drive 
Greaves to banish uncertainty. She considers a thought experiment: 
 
Suppose (somewhat artificially) that I am confronted with the choice of whether or not to 
sign a particular form. After I make my choice, a Stern-Gerlach experiment will be carried 
out. If I signed, my spin-up successor will be force-fed olives, and my spin-down successor 
will be given chocolate. If I didn’t sign, no-one is fed. But I hate olives. How do I decide 
whether having one successor worse off and another better off is preferable to having all 
my successors stuck with the status quo? Do I sign or not? ([2004], §4.3) 
 
And she goes on to write: 
 
I can now say why, in my view, the Reflection approach obscures the logic of Everettian 
decisions. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that, in the above scenario, the relevant 
outcomes (chocolate, hunger, olives) are equally spaced in terms of utility. Then if I strictly 
prefer signing the form to not signing it (perhaps in a fission setup in which the spin-down 
successor has higher quantum-mechanical weight), that is so because I care more about my 
spin-down successor than I do about my spin-up successor. It is not because my post-
fission selves will suffer weighted disorientation, although (as emphasized by the 
Reflection argument) that is also true. (ibid. Greaves’ emphasis) 
 
I shall say more about what Greaves refers to as the Reflection argument shortly. What is important to 
notice here is that she accords explanatory primacy to the notion of pre-measurement caring but gives no 
supporting argument; she merely expresses an opinion. What she means by ‘weighted disorientation’ is 
the state of uncertainty experienced by a post-fission, pre-observation subject. So Greaves seems to 
accept the possibility of an argument with the force of the one I shall be presenting in the next section but 
summarily dismisses it whilst expressing no concern for the strangeness of the unprecedented concept of 
pre-measurement ‘caring’ which is a non-credence attitude operating as if it were a credence. 
If the Reflection argument worked then all that would be required to resolve the puzzle about 
caring would be to suggest that the direction of explanation may go in exactly the opposite direction to 
the one Greaves favours. In that case the non-credence concept of caring would be seen not to be 
primitive but rather derived from that of post-measurement, pre-observation credences. However, it is not 
clear that the Reflection argument does work. Here is how Greaves presents the idea: 
 
But now consider the following decision-theoretic reflection principle: 
If, at time t, I decide rationally to pursue a certain strategy at a later time t´, 
and if I gain no new information relevant to that strategy between times t and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Myrvold’s if applied to justifying the Born-Vaidman rule. 
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t´, then it is rational [i.e. rationally compelling] not to change my choice of 
strategy at t´. (Wallace (2002b), p.58) 
This principle, I think, is a reasonable one, and it holds the key to the second line of 
response to the applicability problem: if we want to apply a decision theory whose 
application is justified under uncertainty, we can apply it directly to the post-fission 
observer stages on the basis of their genuine uncertainty, and appeal to reflection in order to 
argue that the pre-fission observer-stage should adopt the same strategy for action. ([2004], 
§4.2) 
 
Greaves’ quote from Wallace [2002] here is the passage in which Wallace puts in his own words Van 
Fraassen’s Reflection Principle ([1995], passim) and Wallace goes on to note that this principle has been 
challenged by Adam Elga [2000]. That the principle is not universally applicable in the context of QMd 
can quickly be seen by noting that in an actual measurement situation it can be arranged for some of an 
observer’s downstream successors to be immediately and painlessly killed post-measurement so the 
informed downstream post-measurement, pre-observation survivors do indeed gain relevant information 
between t and t´: they know that they are not dead. Furthermore, in any measurement situation we would 
expect there to be non-zero amplitude for deaths of that sort.13 
So it is not clear that the principle which Greaves endorses as reasonable is, after all, acceptable. 
Wallace did not accord any importance to the argument as he himself saw it but remained nonetheless 
open to the possibility that some effective argument might be given for the relevance of post-
measurement uncertainty. Having dubbed as the ‘fission program’ the approach to QMd which aims to do 
without any concept of pre-measurement uncertainty for the informed subject, Wallace writes, with 
reference to the strategy of appealing to post-measurement uncertainty14: 
 
This strategy provides, so far as I can see, the only promising means to salvage the fission 
program; however, I do not find it wholly satisfactory, for two (admittedly very 
inconclusive) reasons. ([2006], §4.2) 
 
In the following section I aim to fulfil the promise in a way which is satisfactory and which does not 
invoke the Reflection Principle.  
 
4 Retroactive counterfactual uncertainty 
 
A convenient starting point for tackling the practical problem for QMd is the analysis of betting 
behaviour. Believing conventional QMs, a subject is generally seen as being able to unproblematically 
                                                
13 This was pointed out to me by David Baker. 
14 The term ‘fission program’ suggests itself because any concept of pre-measurement uncertainty for QMd 
requires that branching does not involve the fission of worlds but rather the divergence of previously isomorphic 
worlds. For an early application of the idea of divergence to QMd see Deutsch ([1985], p.20) and for a current 
application see Saunders [2010]. 
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make judgements about bets on the outcomes of quantum measurements given the probabilities of the 
outcomes and the payoffs associated with them. If would be perplexing if a subject following QMd were 
not to have good reason to behave in at least a fairly similar fashion. However this is a pragmatic matter 
which is not central to the admissibility of QMd as a physical theory which, as we have seen, follows 
from the resolution of the evidential problem. Also, the idea of betting on quantum measurements is 
rather contrived. Even if we live in Everett’s multiverse, when you pull the handle of a normal fruit 
machine the final resting places of the fruit wheels can no doubt be computed in advance given 
reasonably accurate knowledge of their initial speed and the friction acting on them. There will not be a 
branching of the machine and its environment into all the classically possible outcomes with branch 
cross-sections corresponding to the classical probabilities. The branching which takes place will be 
hugely dominated by the quasi-classically determined outcome. In that case it would be appropriate for 
prospective uncertainty to guide betting behaviour exactly as conventionally understood. In most 
everyday situations it would be very challenging to compute to what extent macroscopic processes about 
which decisions are to be made are subject to relevant branching. So for all practical purposes a subject 
tending to believe QMd will remain uncertain about whether a particular context involves relevant 
branching or not simply because of ignorance of the highly complex quantum-mechanical details. Still, it 
is clearly possible to bet on quantum measurements rather than quasi-classical processes and it is natural 
to want to know how a punter should behave if believing QMd rather than QMs. 
Betting normally involves behaving in a way which is believed to maximise personal gain and so 
involves the concepts of personal expectation and identity over time. I shall discuss later how it is 
possible to go beyond these constraints but in the meantime it will be useful to work with them. The 
reason is that the adoption of QMd as a view of our world poses a challenge as to how we can coherently 
speak of persons and objects persisting through time and it is useful to be aware of ways in which that 
challenge can be met. So let us take Hydra back in time. She is about to make a measurement with the 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus and suppose now that it is set up so as to operate as a ‘quantum die’. On pressing 
a button the apparatus measures the spin of a particle of a certain type relative to a particular direction so 
that according to QMs there is a chance of one sixth that it will show the result UP and of five sixths that 
it will show DOWN. According to (simplified) QMd the quantum die, Hydra and her environment 
bifurcate into branches of unequal amplitude, the squared moduli of the amplitudes being one sixth for the 
UP branch and five sixths for the DOWN branch. On the UP branch there will be a ‘successor’ of Hydra 
who sees the result UP. Call her HydraUP. Likewise there will be the successor HydraDOWN on the 
DOWN branch. 
What should Hydra expect to experience if she presses the button on the quantum die? I shall 
proceed on the assumption that she should expect to see the result UP and the result DOWN 
simultaneously as distinct experiences. This is a strange idea. If QMd is indeed coherent it is not for 
nothing that it is taking so long to establish the point. A first thought is that Hydra can only expect to have 
experiences which will be hers and so she must in some sense become HydraUP and become 
HydraDOWN in order to expect having each of their experiences simultaneously. It can perhaps be 
argued that personal expectancy need not depend on continuing personal identity but there are various 
theories in the literature on persistence which might be used to maintain Hydra’s identity. Since it would 
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be difficult to live with QMd if it were not possible to track the identities of persons and objects in the 
multiverse I shall adopt a way of speaking which allows for such tracking. Examples of theories which 
ostensibly are able to cope with persistence through fission and might be applicable to what follows are 
John Perry’s ‘lifetime’ theory [1972], Ted Sider’s ‘stage’ theory [1996, 2001] and André Gallois’ 
‘occasional identity’ [1998]. I shall use Sider’s stage theory because it is perspicuous and fairly well 
established though of course not without its critics. 
According to stage theory persons are momentary stages so Hydra, HydraUP and HydraDOWN 
are distinct persons. However, HydraUP and HydraDOWN are future ‘temporal counterparts’ of Hydra 
which means that Hydra bears the relation will be to HydraUP and HydraDOWN severally and HydraUP 
and HydraDOWN bear the relation was to Hydra. This idea is an adaptation of David Lewis’s [1968] 
introduction of  ‘counterpart theory’ to modal logic according to which Hubert Humphrey bore the 
relation might have been to being elected president if and only if he had a modal counterpart who became 
president. On Sider’s view ([2001], p. 201), which is applied to thought experiments about personal 
fission rather than QMd, Hydra can expect to become HydraUP and she can expect to become 
HydraDOWN. This analysis of fission applies generally to transtemporal identities not just that of persons 
so ApparatusUP, which shows the result UP, and ApparatusDOWN, which shows the result DOWN, are 
distinct apparatuses but each of them was the very apparatus which Hydra prepared to make the quantum 
measurement.  
Returning to the quantum die, let QMd be Hydra’s guiding hypothesis. After having pressed the 
button, if blindfolded and applying the Born-Vaidman rule, HydraUP and HydraDOWN would each 
assign a credence of one sixth to seeing the result UP on removing the blindfold. And being betting 
women they would both be prepared to lay a stake if told that they would be paid seven-to-one if they 
were to see the result UP. Now suppose that Hydra is blindfolded before playing and is told that the 
blindfold won’t be removed until a minute after she presses the button. She is also told that there will be 
no payoff unless the stake is laid before playing, as is usual when betting on dice rolls. In this situation 
the well-informed Hydra can confidently expect that immediately after pressing the button she will assign 
a credence of one sixth to seeing the result UP and would want to lay a stake for a seven-to-one payoff on 
that result. Hydra can be confident that after pressing the button she will regret not having laid a stake 
beforehand if she has not done so. That seems to be a compelling reason for Hydra to lay a stake before 
pressing the button. So blindfolded Hydra has good reason to lay a stake in advance, just like a person 
who takes the quantum die to have a conventional stochastic dynamical evolution rather than a dendritic 
evolution. 
Some qualification is called for here. Hydra will know that HydraUP will be aware that whilst she 
has won there is a closely related person who has lost, which may temper HydraUP’s pleasure. Likewise, 
Hydra will know that HydraDOWN will be aware that whilst she has lost there is a closely related person 
who has won, which may temper HydraDOWN’s displeasure. This thought could have an effect on what 
odds blindfolded HydraUP and HydraDOWN judge to be sufficient to make it worth laying a stake. 
However, on Sider’s analysis HydraUP and HydraDOWN are distinct people who are not in causal 
contact. Conventionally, if a punter were convincingly told by a demon that she had a doppelganger on a 
planet in a distant galaxy and that things would be arranged so that if she won a bet her doppelganger 
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would lose and vice versa would that make a difference to how the punter bet? Perhaps. It would be a 
matter of individual judgement but many people may not be too bothered about the fate of a distant 
doppelganger. It is true that HydraUP and HydraDOWN have a common history but that has been and 
gone by the time the crucial quantum measurement has been made and decoherence has in a sense 
brought more distance between them than being in different galaxies.  
I shall return to the theme of possible anomalous consequences for betting behaviour in the final 
section but first we need to consider what attitude Hydra can reasonably adopt if she is not blindfolded 
when offered bets on the quantum die. What if she does not expect to be in a state of post-measurement, 
pre-observation ignorance? The challenge to Hydra in this situation is how to weight the utilities of her 
successors and it is plausible that there is no reason for this to differ from the way she would make 
judgements if blindfolded. To see why, imagine that Hydra were told that so long as she laid a trivial 
stake before a measurement HydraUP would get an enormous payoff and HydraDOWN would simply 
lose the stake. In that case it would seem compelling that Hydra should lay the stake for there would be so 
much to gain and so little to lose. But if the ratio between the stake and the payoff is progressively 
reduced where should Hydra draw the line between laying and not laying a stake in advance? The 
possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation ignorance provides a guide here, so long as the Born-
Vaidman rule is assumed. Hydra knows that if she were blindfolded after the measurement she would 
want a stake to have been laid beforehand if the payoff on seeing UP is better than six-to-one, setting 
aside the proviso I mentioned. Hydra knows that HydraDOWN will be disappointed to have lost but she 
also knows that HydraDOWN cannot reasonably regret having laid a stake on a bet which she would have 
thought good had she been blindfolded.  
So it looks as though Hydra without the blindfold still has good reason to lay the stake in advance, 
just like a subject believing QMs, always bearing in mind the qualification about possible empathy 
between winner and loser. It’s not that Hydra is compelled to take into account what her attitude would be 
if she were blindfolded post-measurement but it is an option open to her which is not obviously 
unreasonable and provides a coherent strategy. Post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty can 
constrain pre-measurement betting behaviour for a subject adopting QMd even if that uncertainty does 
not actually occur because simply considering the predicament of the post-measurement, pre-observation 
subject is enough to guide a punter’s reasoning. So counterfactual post-measurement uncertainty can be 
effective in determining pre-measurement betting behaviour in a way which bears a good deal of 
similarity to the pre-measurement uncertainty of conventional stochastic quantum mechanics. 
The argument has been based on an example of betting for personal gain but it can be detached 
from strictly personal interests15. Imagine that the demon convinces Hydra that some time after the 
quantum die measurement takes place a distant country will be blighted by plague in all worlds issuing 
from the DOWN branch, of relative cross-section five sixths, unless she makes a significant sacrifice 
before pressing the button, in which case it will be in the worlds issuing from the UP branch that that 
country will be blighted by plague. If Hydra reflects on the predicament of inhabitants of that country 
who are ignorant of the origin of their world but aware of the general setup she will realise that any such 
                                                
15 As Greaves and Myrvold point out ([2010], §3). 
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subject accepting the Born-Vaidman rule would assign a credence of one sixth to having issued from the 
UP branch and five sixths to having issued from the DOWN branch. All those future subjects would, in 
general, hope that Hydra had made the appropriate sacrifice and Hydra would know that in advance, 
which might be enough to motivate her to make the sacrifice even though she has no self-centred interest 
in the outcome. 
We have seen that a subject adopting QMd as a guiding hypothesis need not be rendered incapable 
of making rational future-directed decisions in the special quantum-measurement circumstances where 
the various outcomes of an action are presumed to exist simultaneously in different branches of a 
multiverse. The very possibility of applying the Born-Vaidman rule post-branching to assign credences to 
outcomes can serve as a substantive guide to pre-branching action.  However, there are bizarre 
consequences of the overall picture which I must discuss before closing.   
 
 
5 Odds and ends 
 
When there is more at stake than a fairly trivial bet the reservation on Hydra making judgements about 
decisions on the basis of Born-Vaidman rule credences looks more pressing. An adaptation of Huw 
Price’s ‘Legless at Bondi’ thought experiment can illustrate the point ([2010], §6)16. Imagine that Hydra 
had lost a leg to a shark and were offered a new form of treatment which involved a quantum 
measurement where, to simplify, there were two relevant downstream branches. On one branch of very 
high amplitude she would awake from the treatment with two good legs and on the other very low-
amplitude branch, as an unavoidable consequence of the treatment, she would awake with no legs at all. 
Supposing that a post-operative patient could be held in a state of wakefulness whilst unaware of whether 
she were legless or not, the above argument suggests that Hydra’s pre-operative decision should be based 
on the post-operative Born-Vaidman rule credence assignments. Given a credence of only one in a billion 
of finding oneself legless most people would opt for the treatment. But if assuming QMd Hydra can be 
sure in advance that the treatment will result in there being a legless person. Price suggests, with good 
reason, that a case like this bears some similarity to the famous Trolley Problem, mentioning the version 
where a fat man might be pushed off a bridge to his death in order to stop a runaway tram and thereby 
save several passengers. Price notes that most people reject killing the fat man. Likewise it might be 
though Hydra would similarly have to reject the leg treatment given that she were confident that there 
would be a legless person paying a terrible price for the relief of the bipedal one. There is, of course, an 
important difference between the QMd case and the Trolley Problem analogue. The patient offered the 
quantum branching treatment, on Sider’s analysis of transtemporal identity, can believe that it is she who 
will be each of the downstream people. If Hydra goes ahead with the treatment she will know that the 
person finding herself legless will have only herself to blame for having accepted the treatment in the 
sense that the legless person was the person who signed the consent form. 
                                                
16 This problem for the fission program is discussed by Greaves and Myrvold ([2010], Objection 8). 
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But I do not wish to play down too much the differences between decision-making according to 
QMs and QMd. It is plausible that for ordinary rambles through brambles Hydra’s betting judgements if 
assuming QMd need not differ very much, if at all, from those she would make if assuming QMs but 
there may well be special circumstances where that is not so. That does not constitute a threat to the 
scientific credentials of QMd as it only makes practical action problematic, not the evaluation of 
evidence. My point is that nonetheless a subject assuming QMd is far from being entirely at sea in respect 
of practical action.  The very possibility of Born-Vaidman rule credence assignments can serve as a 
substantive guide to pre-measurement decision making, a guide which in non-extreme circumstances may 
be pretty much as good as conventional assignments based on presumed chances. 
Finally, we need to consider a class of betting scenarios even more extreme than Price’s example. 
Imagine that the quantum die is modified so as to kill HydraDOWN instantly and painlessly before she 
observes the result in her branch whilst HydraUP gets a large payoff. This is quantum Russian roulette 
(qRr) with five bullets in the cylinder. If Hydra knows that HydraDOWN is to die instantly it can seem 
that Hydra should expect with certainty to get the payoff. I have argued in support of that conclusion 
elsewhere [2004] and that argument would also apply to Greaves’ and Myrvold’s view17. However, we 
should hesitate in taking this as a way for Hydra to make easy money since she would know that her 
young children would be left motherless in the fatal branch, something she would care about very much. 
But even if not necessarily a route to easy money this view is a radically different perspective on qRr 
scenarios from that yielded by QMs. According to QMs, if you play qRr you have a good chance of 
bringing an end to your personal experience. That is not so on the analysis I have presented. 
Furthermore, the post-measurement, pre-observation credence assignments must be renormalized 
in scenarios of this sort and cease to be numerically equal to branch cross-sections (squared moduli of 
amplitudes). For instance, if HydraUP is well informed and blindfolded and knows that the quantum 
measurement has taken place she will be confident that she will see UP when the blindfold is removed 
since she knows that she cannot be HydraDOWN, who dies immediately. However, the relative cross-
section of HydraUP’s branch is one sixth. She must renormalize this value to unity in making her 
blindfolded judgement of the credence for seeing UP.  
If Hydra had full confidence in QMd and were wholly egocentric and if she were offered the 
chance of playing qRr with a guaranteed reward on the UP branch then it would seem that she ought not 
hesitate to play. Disturbing as it is, that is an unavoidable consequence of the view I have developed. 
There is a further bizarre consequence. Suppose that Hydra were offered a round of qRr with guaranteed 
reward for the survivor but she were told that she must wear a blindfold. Also, when the readout has come 
up on the quantum die HydraUP and HydraDOWN will hear a bell and a little later HydraDOWN will be 
killed and HydraUP will get the reward. In that case Hydra can be certain that if she plays she will find 
herself in a state of great anxiety, being uncertain whether or not the quantum die in her downstream 
branch has shown DOWN or not. So even if Hydra cares for no-one but herself it will make a huge 
                                                
17 Greaves’ and Myrvold’s work would benefit from consideration of qRr. I think it is a mistake that qRr is often 
left out of discussion of the Everett interpretation as it can only help to clarify what is proving to be a very 
tortuous subject. 
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difference to her whether she is offered the round of qRr with or without the blindfold and delay 
mechanism or some equivalent variant of that setup. 
Again, this discussion of Hydra’s expectations about her future has nothing to do with the 
effectiveness of QMd in making physical predictions and providing a means for their verification. As we 
saw in §2, that is quite impersonal. In qRr contexts QMd assigns branch cross-sections to outcomes which 
are numerically equal to the Born rule values. The fatal branches exist. It is only when the foregoing 
analysis is applied to the personal experience of a subject that that subject’s expectations part company 
with what would be demanded by conventional wave-collapse theory in qRr scenarios. 
The anomalies simply indicate how physical theory may have surprising consequences for our 
understanding of the human predicament. David Lewis warned that acceptance of QMd could have 
terrifying implications for our conception of death [2004]. I believe that he made a plausible case, but one 
cannot reject a physical theory just because it seems unpalatable, as Lewis himself of course recognised. 
However, these anomalies might be avoided if there were available a concept of pre-measurement 
uncertainty for QMd. The argument here has only been that pre-measurement uncertainty is not necessary 
for the acceptability of QMd as a scientific theory so long as a satisfactory explanation of the Born-
Vaidman rule is available. Bizarre consequences do not make a theory unscientific. 
Recall Max Born’s words in the opening quote: ‘somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a concept, 
unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the road’. Ironically, the Born rule ushered 
in the idea that our observed environment evolves stochastically in quantum measurement contexts. That 
is not justified by experience. 
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